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In the Supreme Court
of the State 1Jf Utah
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF RIGHTS TO TI-IE USE OF
ALL \rATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, IN rrH:BJ
ESCALANTE VALLEY DRAI~
AGE AREA,
In re: Water User's Claim No. 483,
Underground Water Claim No. 7664,
Walter W. Cook, Claimant.

No. 8G25

\YALTER 'N. COOK,
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs .

•TOREPH ~I. TRACY, State
Engineer of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATE~IENT

OF TIIE BRIEF

This cause is before this Court as an intermediate
appeal or an appeal from an interlocutory order made and
entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court of the State
of Utah, in and for Iron ,County, involving a well and
underground water right of the appellant, Walter \V.
Cook.
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As indicated by the title of the case, a proceeding
was originally initiated as a general adjudication of
all of the rights to the use of water in the Escalante
Valley Drainage Area: in Utah, which includes the :Milford
Underground water basin immediately south of the City
of :\filford in Beaver County.
After complying with th,e provisions of Chapter 4 of
Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and after completion
of a hydrographic surYey of the area, the State Engineer
on or abont the 1st day of April, 1949, served and filed in
the District Court of Iron County his Proposed Determination of Water in said area.
In the due course of said general adjudication proceedings, and on or about the 6th day of October, 1943, this
appellant, then the owner of said premises, filed a statement of water user's claim in this proceeding as provided
by statute, and said statement of claim 'Yas by the Clerk of
the District Court assigned a number, to-wit, No. 483;
and thereafter by the said proposed determination the
elaim was wholly disallowed by the State Engineer. Thereupon the claimant filed his objection and protest to the
(li~allowanre of his ~Yell and underg:round water right
claiming that he was the owner of a forty acre tract of
land; that in the month of ~-\ pril, 1924, his predecessor in
inten•st commenced to rlrill and sink a well on the said
premis0s and during the month of l\Iay, 1924, completed
the said wP11; tlwt tlw well wns afterwards equipped with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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proper pumping equipment and in l\Iay of said year water
from the well beneficially used in the irrigation of forty
acres of land and that such beneficial use of the waters
from the said well continued during the irrigation season
of said year; that the flow from said well was one second
foot of water.
Thereafter a hearing \Vas duly held by the Distriet
Court on the said protest, after which the Court made and
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and an
interlocutory order (Tr. 12-14), denying the claim and
protest of the appellant.
A petition for interlocutory appeal from said orders
was filed in accordance 'vith and as provided by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (Tr. 1-6) and which appeal was
duly allowed and granted by order of said Court (Tr. 1517).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the follo\ving statement of facts it is not deemed
necessary to re-state those which are incorporated in the
foregoing statement of the case, many of which are taken
almost bodily from the trial court's findings and conC'lusions (Tr. 12-13).
While the State Engineer and the claimant and appellant herein differ as to the correctness of the court'~
conclusions of law and the interlocutory order based
thereon, there is no controversy whatsoever eoncerning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the facts.
The said findings of fact,_ the pertinent portions of
which, insofar as this controversy is concerned, are briefly
as follows:
1. That on or about the 6th day of October, 1943, the

claimant, Walter W. Cook, filed a statement of water
user's claim in the general adjudication proceedings and
the statement of claim was assigned No. 483, and by the
proposed determination of the claim was wholly disallowed by the State Engineer (Tr. 12-13).
2. That the claim was based upon underground water
claim No. 7664, which claim, as filed on March 12, 1936 by
Theodore Kronholm (predecessor in interest to appellant), showed that a well was drilled on the property involved in April and ~fay of the year 1924 and that water
from the well was used to irrigate forty acres in the year
1924, with a flow of one second foot of water. ('rr. 13j.
3. That there was no use of water from the well during
the year 1930 or at any tin1e subsequent thereto prior to
l\Iarch 22, 1~):~5, t.he effective date of the 1935 act dealing
with underground water. (Tr. 13).
4. That no contention is made by either party, including tlH' StntP Engineer, that the appellant intended to
abandon the use of the water from the well and no finding
wuH made ns to abandonment. (Tr. 13).
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From the foregoing findings of facts the trial court
concluded:
·~

1. That failure to use water from the well during the

years 1930 to 1934, both inclusive, constituted non-use for
a continuance period of five years and resulted in forfeiture of the right under the provisions of the laws of
Utah then in full force and effect. (Tr. 13).
2. That the action of the State Engineer in disallo,ving
the claim of appellant should be approved and confirmed
(Tr. 13).
Thereupon the interlocutory orders appealed from
was made and entered by the trial court (Tr. 14). disallowing the claim of appellant thus leaving him without
the right to use any water whatsoever from his well.
·;·

A very short hearing was had before the trial court
on June 9, 1954, and a transcript thereof is made a part
of the record on this appeal (Tr. 1-5).
The testimony given at the hearing is fairly reflected
in the findings. The claimant testified that he is the owner
of the premises formerly a part of a tract owned by Th8odore Kronholm; he acquired the title to the premises
around 1938 or 1939; that Kronholm used water from tho
well to irrigate forty acres for some time after the well
was drilled in 1924 and that there was no irrigation from
the well in 1930 or subsequent thereto, but that all of the
irrigation was prior to 19:~0. (Tr. 2-4).
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It was agreed at the hearing that the State Engineer
made no issue to the acreage previously irrigated (Tr. 4),
and that there was presented to the court the legal problem of as whether the well right was lost through non-user
(Tr. 4).
The findings (Findings :No.7, Abs. 13) removes from
the problem before the Court any issue as to voluntary
abandonment, since the State Engineer did not claim and
does not now claim any loss of the well right because of
abandonment.
The proposed determination disallowing the claim of
appellant was first filed in the District Court and served
upon water users in _.:\ pril of 1949. (See notation thereof
in the exhibit which is a copy of the proposed determination).
STATE~IEXT

OF ERRORS RELIED OX

1. The trial court erred in concluding that failure to

use water from appellant's well during the years 1930 to
1934, both inclusin_~, constituted a loss of the well right
through non-use.
3. The trial court erred in making and entering its
interlocutor:· order denying the rlain1 and protest of appPll:mt, "·hich onlcr has the pffcrt of dcpriYing- the ap:pellant of the right to usc tlll• water frmn said well for any
purpo~·'<' whatsocYcr.
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ARGUMENT
The above statement

~pecifies

two errors which in

substance and effect are but one; and the sole question to
be decided by this Honorable Court is simply this:
Was a well right prior to the enactment of the underground water act of 1935 considered as subject to the nonuser statute in effect prior thereto; or, put another way,
did the enactment of the underground water act have the
effect of foreclosing a well owner from the use of his '"'ell
through a previous five-year non-use thereof~
Appellant contends not.
Prior to the underground water act of 1935 the nonuser statute provided as follows :
When an appropriator or his successor in interest abandons or ceases to use water for a period
of five years the right ceases, and thereupon such
water reverts t~o the public, and may be again appropriated as provided in this title. :1:100-1-4
R.S.U. 1933.
The underground water statute of 1935 amended the
above section, {Ch. 104, Session Laws of 1935), and tho
amendment became effective during :March of 1935, before
the commencement of the irrigation season of that year.
The amendment incorporated the provisions of :1:100-1-4
R.S.U. 1933, and added a provision, with appropriate procedure, whereby before the expiration of such five-yeo r
period the appropriator or his successor in inten·~t might
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apply for an application for an extension of time up to
five years within which to resume the use of such water.
This amended act concludes with the clause ''provided,
that nothing in this section shall apply to underground or
subterranean waters''.
The Court will observe that we do not pose the question: Did the non-user statute in effect prior to the effective date of the amendment thereof apply, to underground
water~ We pm;e the question which we deem decisive: \Vas
a well right prior to the effective date of the amendment
of the non-user statute considered as subject to the provisions of such statutes~
When the office of State Engineer was created and
the general water act of 1903 \Vas passed ( Ch. 100, Sesswn
Laws of Utah, 1903), Section 48 thereof was a non-user
statute substantially as carried forward into Section 1001-4, R.S.U. 1933, excepting that the early statute provided
for a seYen year non-use period in lieu of the present five:·par non-use period.
In January of 1935, in the cases of Wt·athall rs .Johnsuu, ~(; Utah .)0, JO Pnc. ~ncl 73;>, and .Jusft'SCJI rs. Olsen,
Hti Utah 1:->H, -t-O Pnc. :2nd ~0~. it ,,·as held that the law of
appropriation applit>s to the waters of subterranean and
art<'~inn hnsins. Thereafter the Legislature of 1935, large1)· on account of t hP holdings in the above two cases, made
~nhRtantinl ch:mg('S in the \\-ater act of 1903, and added
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other sections regulating the appropriation and use of the
waters of subterranean and artesian basins.
The early statute (t47, Ch. 100, Session Laws of
Utah, 1903) provided as follows:
The \Vaters of all streams and other sources in
this State, whether flowing above or underground,
in known or defined channels, is herehy declared to
be the property of the public su"Qject to all existing rights to the use thereof.
The 1935 statute (t100-1-1 Session Laws of Utah,
1935) as amended provides as follo·w·s:
All waters in this State, whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing- rights to
the use thereof.
Again we emphasize the language of the non-user
statute from 1903 up to and including the 1935 amendment. The statute provides ''when an appropriator ceases
to use water for a period of five years the right ceases
and the water may be again appropriated as provided in
this title."
The question then is - Until the 1935 enactment, or
until the \Vrathall case v;a~ decided in 1935, did the courts,
legislature, bar and the public in general understand that
the law of 1903 and the procedure to be followed appliell
to underground water basins~ And as a corollary, - Prior
to the 1935 enactment was it considered that a well right,
acquired without the necessity of appropriating the water
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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therefrom, could be subject to the non-user statute, when
the owner of the well right was not considered an "appropriator." Further, was it considered that water not
subject to appropriation would revert to the public to be
again appropriated?
The answer to the above queries is found in the several solemn pronouncements of this Honorable Court.
This court throughout its history has recognized that percolating waters are not public waters
but belong to the soil through which they pass and
are the property of the owner thereof, and are not
the subject of appropriation. (Citing a long line of
Utah cases).*':'*""
Our concept of what was and what was not
percolating waters has changed greatly since that.
term was used in the early cases. In those cases
·we described percolating waters as not "naturally
flowing in a stream with a well defined channe1.
banks and course.'' _-\.gain percolating waters -wete
defined as "pereolating through the soil, or flowino· in a subterranean stream, ha,-ing no defined or
ln~wn ehannels, courses or banks." * * * * Until
1!):~:> the derision~ of this Court treated the waters
of arte~ian basins as percolating waters, and as
fmrh the o1n1trship wcut ll'ith the owners of the
grouud wlwn.' such wah'rs Wl~re locat~d !lnd w_ere
unf <'onsidered to be subjl'el to appropnatwn. Rwrda 11 rs. Trest ll'Ood, 11.) Utah :213, :203 Pnc. 2nd 92~,
(lt'eidl'd in 10-t.~l.

In Riordau rs. Tr,shrood, supra, we noted that
t.his court lw~ alu·ays recognized that percolating
Wltf<>r:-; :tre not publi(' waters but an~ a part of the
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ground through which they pass and belong to the
owner thereof, ''rith well recognized exceptions to
such rule none of whirh have a bearing on our
problem in this rase. \V e also noted that in recent
years our concept of what are percolating waters
have undergone great rhange. TV eber Basin liVater
Co11serrrmcy District rs. Gailc1J, ____ Utah ______ , 303
Pac. 2nd 271, at page ~7 4.
In the case ofiianson 1·s Salt Lake City, 115 Utah_
404, 205 Pac. 2nd 255, Justice Vol ade has very fully and
ably discussed the history of water rights in Utah and in
pointing out wherein the Session Laws of Utah, 1935,
brought underground water under the jurisdiction of rrhe
State Engineer and the reasons therefore. Quoting from
page 238 of 205 Pac. 2nd:
-''From the earliest times this court has recognized that percolating waters were not subject to
appropriation as a part of the pttblic waters of the
state. Such waters were said to be a part of the
ground through which they passed and belonged to
the owner thereof the same as the rocks, soil and
other materials thereof to the lowest depth, and th~
o1cner thereof could use such 1,cater as he sa1u fit.
* * * "' In 1935 the cases of \Vrathall vs. Johnson
and Justesen vs. Olsen held that the law of appropriation applies to the waters of subterranean and
artesian basins.''
Quoting from page 260 of 205 Pac. 2nd, Justice
\Y ade states :
"As previom:~ly pointed out prior to the \\' ra 1hall case, the courts, leg·islatun~, lmr and the public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in general apparently understood that the law of
1903 prescribing the procedure to be followed in
order to acquire the right to use unappropriated
public 'water did not apply to underground water
basins. * «, * * It is clear that the legislature did not
intend, at the time of these enactments (statutes of
1903) that these statutory provisions should govern the appropriation of underground waters such
as are involved in this case because it did not understand that such water could be appropriated.
So it made no provision for such a procedure. Later
this court held that such waters were subject to appropriation and then the legislature amended the
provisions so as to provide for the appropriation
of sw~h waters. In the meantime many persons had
appropriated such waters to a beneficial use and
no doubt such persons would have complied with
the statutory regulations had the legislature made
it clear that such was its intention. It would be a
great injustice to hold that these people acquired
no right to the use of such waters by appropriating
them to a beneficial use because thev had failed to
comply with statutor~- regulations ~hich the legislature at that time did not intend thev should compi~· with and the courts have held -...v~re not appli~
a ble to their cat'e. Xo one has been harmed by then
failure to ron1ply with tlwsL~ regulations."
It is true that in the Hanson case the problem before
the court was whether a well right could be forfeited and
deemed lost when the water therefrom had not been
appropriated. But the principle remains the same. In the
instant case, if the courts, bar, legislature and general
public understand that the· law of 1903, including the
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non-user statute, did not apply to underground water
basins, and understood that percolating waters were not
public waters but belonged to the owner of the soil, then
it would be a great injustice to hold that the well owners
were ''appropriators'' and that by a non-use of their own
"private" as distinguished from "public" water it could
revert to the public to be again appropriated.
In all seriousness we might ask: vVhat purpose could
possibly be subserved by a well owner losing a right to
the use of his own water through non-user, when he could
immediately thereafter resume the use of his water because it was not public water and subject to appropriation 1

, "II

And if, prior to the enactment of the 1935 act, a member of the bar should be consulted regarding the effect
of the non-user statute concerning underground water,
how could such lawyer be expected to advise his client
that a well right was subject to the non-user statute in
the light of the decisions and pronouncements of this
court prior to the \Vrathall case.
It must be remembered that the 1935 legislative enactment was passed and became effective prior to the
commencement of the irrigation season of 1935. In other
words, prior to March, 1935, well owners had been led
"by the courts, legislature, bar and general public" to
believe their water was not public water and therefore
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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could not be subject to the non-user statute. If the disallowance of the appellant's well right, both by the State
Engineer and the trial court, shall stand, then the appellant's well right was taken away from him and forever
lost through no fault of his own and without any notice
whatsoever, and without being given any opportunity to
protect his right by resuming the use of the well.
At this point it is appropriate to comment on the
fact that the legislature of 1935 did not intend the nonuser statute to apply to underground or subterranean
·waters because it expressly exempted the same from
that statute in their amendment to the old non-user statute, and provided that as to other waters extensions of
time to use the water could be obtained by application
therefor. If we can credit the legislature with intending
to invoke the non-user statute as to underground waters,
then this inconsistent and absurd situation would be the
net

re~n It

:

\Veil owners who lwd tlrilled their wells and equipped the san1e at large expense and who had established a
good right but had not used the water for the years of
19~~0, 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934, would be summarily
wiped o11t. But well owners who had u~ed water during
the ypa r 1~l;W, but who had failed to usc the watC'r for
the ~·t'ars 1931, 1~1;1:.~, 1933 and 1934 w·ould not lose the
right to the n~C' of ilw wnh'r and could continue thP nonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Ill

use thereof for any number of years thereafter without
losing the same because the 1935 amendment expressly
exempted underground and subterranean waters from
the non-user statute. 1\f oreover, well owners "'hose
rights were established by appropriation after 1935 would
be given the benefit of the exemption from non-use,
while well O\vners with many years of priority were wiped
out without notice of any kind after being led to believe
their water was not public water, was not subject to appropriation, but belonged to the owner of the soil. Thus,
giving a distinct advantage to a later appropriator as
against an early one is contrary to every concept of our
water law.
Since the 1945 legislature amended :1:100-1-4 U.C.A.
Hl-!3 (Ch. 134, Session Laws of Utah, 1945) by striking
out the last sentence : ''provided, however, that nothing
in this section shall apply to underground or subterranran waters,'' underground and artesian waters are now
subject to the non-user statute. However, after the enactment of the 1945 amendment, the State Engineer has
taken the position, and correctly so, that well owners had
five years thereafter v:ithin which to resume the use of
water before he could invoke the non-user statute, and
at any time before the expiration of such five-year period
the well owner could apply for an extension of time within which to resume the use of his water.
The question now before this court, therefore, is one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that affects the well rights of the appellant and a Yery
few other well rights that were similarly disallowed because of a five-year non-use prior to 1935. After that
and for a period of ten years non-use of underground
water was exempted from the effect of the statute, and
since 1945 there is no question about the loss of an underground right through non-use for five years unless
an extension of time within which to resume use has been
applied for and approved. Therefore, as to all well rights
excepting· those few which were disallowed because of a
five-year non-use prior to 1935, the question before this
court is moot.
The problem here presented seems to be one of first
impression in this state. The State Engineer, in urging
upon the trial court the correctness of his position that
the non-user statute applied to underground ·water prior
to 1935, h~aned heavily upon the rase of Fairfield ln·igation Company rs. r'arson, ........... rtah ............ , :2-1:7 Pac. 2nd

1004. The factual situation in the Fairfield case is far
different than the ~itnation in the instant case. In the
Fairfield case the ground on which the wells had been
drilled was acquired h:· 011e Thon1as through purchase
from the county, "·hich had acquired the title because of
non-payment of taxr~. That initiated a new title and the
~w·<·P~~or in inten'~t of Th01nn~ eommrnred the use of
ti1P water in l!l33 before tlw effectiYe date of the 1935
cnneiment. ':Phi~ eonrt. hrlcl that "under our concept
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prior to the 1935 change, they had the right to use those
waters as they saw fit without filing an application to
appropriate them * * * and came squarely within the exception recognized in the Iianson case.'' The statement
concerning the loss t;D.rough abandonment and non-user
of the original right by the driller of the wells was therefore not necessary to the ultimate decision and the same
result would have obtained had this court never mentioned or commented on the non-user statute. We believe it is a fair statement when "\Ve say this court did not
have in mind when deciding the Fairfield case any situation such as now presented.
As a matter of fact, although the word "non-user"
Is used in the Fairfield case, the water right was ]ost
through voluntary abandonment rather than non-user,
excepting as a five-year non-use in that case was necessarily included in the abandonment period of seven
years from 1905 to 1912. The pumping operation was
discontinued in the year 1905 ~by the original owner of
the land on which the wells were located and the water
company allowed the taxes assessed against the land to
become delinquent and to be sold to the county for taxes
and the pump and pipe line were dismantled. The words
"abandonment" and "non-user" appear to be used together whereYcr mentioned and nowhere in the opinion
i~ the question of non-user ever discussed separately or
otherwise than in connection with the actual voluntary
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abandonment. ~[oreover, the matter of abandonment
and non-user are discussed only in the light of the dispute as between two parties and as to which had a better
right and the express issue of whether non-user could
apply to underground water in the sense that it would
revert to the public as public water, was not before the
court.
The court in the Fairfield case adhered to its prior
holding in the IIanson case that prior to 1935 underground waters were considered to belong to the owner of
the ground on which they were located as a part thereof
and not public waters or subject to appropriation. The
court also stressed the fact that in the Hanson case there
was recognized an exception to the rule that all water
m,ust be appropriated after 1903, and again reiterated
the reason for the exception, which was to preYent hardship and injustice to underground water users who were
misled into not filing an application for appropriation
and neither the legislature, courts, engineer's office, bar
nor the general public prior to 1933 intended to require
sneh an application in underground or well cases.

n ndcr

the exception notL•d in the Hanson case and
recognized both before and thereafter, a well owner was
justified in belieYing that he o"~ned tlw water underlying
his premis<':-> awl that it was not public and not subject
to appropriation. 'rherefore, he could use or not use
the wnt<>r as he snw fit without placing it in nny jeopSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ardy. This situation prevailed until. the moment the 1935
enactment became effective. In other words, he could
resume the nsc of his water up to the day, or in fact up
to the very moment the 1935 act went into effect. The
very next moment - when the act was effective it expressly provided that there could be no loss of underg-round water. Then at exactly ·vi'hat point does the nonuser apply and come into operation. Appellant contends
it is not possible to evade the proposition that as to underground water there could be no application of the
non-user, as distinguished from a voluntary abandonment.
There appears to be another reason why this Court
should determine that the appellant has not forfeited his
well right through non-user, and that the legislature did
not intend by the 1935 enactment to invoke the non-user
or forfeiture statute as to underground water rights acquired prior thereto. It is not necessary to cite any
authority for the fact that a water right of any kind,
whether acquired through appropriation or otherwise, and
the priority thereof, is a valuable vested property right.
It also is elementary that such property right is entitled
to the same consideration and protection against the impairment and/or loss thereof as any other property.
The legislature is without power to impair or
destroy the obligations of contractual or vested
rights and any statute which affects a vested right
cannot be given retrospective operation. In re
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Thrrunm's Estate, 183 Pac. 2nd 97, at Page 103
(Cal).
In the ahsenc0 of a clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary, en~ry statute will be construed to operate prospectively, and will not be
construed to affect pending proceedings unless such
intention is expressly declared or necessarily implied from its language (Citing cases). Here there
is no such declaration nor is the intention necessarily implied from the language of the amendment.
The construction contended for by appellant would
work an injustice to parties to the pending litigation, a result which cannot be presumed the legislature intended. The amendment should not be
given retroactive operation. In re Thramm's Estate, supra.
While the factual situation is entirely different in
the case of Toronto vs. Sheffield, 118 l~tah 460, 2:22 Pac.
2nd 594, the principle of law invoh·ed is the same. In the
Toronto case this court held unenforceable a statute
which barred a defense upon the effectiYe date of an
amendment to a limitation ~tatute without allowing any
time thereafter within which to bring an action. In our
case, if the State Enginerr 's position can be sustained,
the amendment of 1935 as to underground water would
not onl~· impair but would strike down entirely a Yaluable property right ·without aecording the property owner
an)· time within which to prott>d his right by resuming
nse of the wah'r. In the Toronto case this court stated:
"The lt>gi~.;]ature rna~· bar a claim within a reasonable
timt> within tlH' (•ffret i\·r datt> of tlw statute."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

In the case of TT"esfcrn Ilolding Oo. rs. iVorth-lVcst('J"'Jl Land a'ltd Loan Compa1ly, 120 Pac. 2nd 557 (Mont.),
cited in the Toronto casP, the rourt said:
The legislature nm~, establish a limitation applying to a cause of action as to which none existed
before and may change existing statutes and shorten period of limitation, but provisions must be made
allowing reasonable time for actions to be brought
that otherwise would be instantl:r barred.
The above legal principles are so well established
that it is not deemed necessary to multiply the authorities.
However, we believe this rasr can and should be decided upon the principle that the legislature never did
intend, when it enacted the 1935 amendment, to declare
(retroactively) that an underground water right should
be wiped out instantly by the non-user when the legislature was well aware, as expressed by this Court in several
cases, that the courts, the state engineer, the bar and the
general public were led to believe and did believe that underground water was not public water, not subject to appropriation and belonged to the owner of the soil.
We apprehend that the respondent may urge upon
this Court that immediately after the effective date of
the 1933 amendment, the appellant could have filed an
application to appropriate water from the well. If such
position should be urged then the court should bear in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

mind that (a) there is nothing in the amendment which
even squints at the fact it was intended to invoke the fiveyear non-user statute as against underground water, but
(b) by the amendment underground water was exempted
from the effect of the five-year non-user statute; (c) that
the proposed determination disallowing such water right
was not issued by the State Engineer until 1949, some
fourteen years after 1935, which was the first notice
appellant or any well owner similarly situated had of
knowing the position taken by the State Engineer; (d)
the predecessor in interest of the appellant in :March,
1936, took every precaution to protect his well right by
filing with the State Engineer the statutor:T underground
claim; (e) the well owner relied on the pronouncements
of the Court that his underground water right v~·as not
public water and belonged to him as the O\\~er of the
soil.
Plaintiff and claimant herein respectfully submit
that the interlocntory order of the trial court sustaining
the State Engineer should be rcYersed and set aside and
the well right held not forfeited and lost by reason of the
1935 amendment.

Respectfully submitted,

.Affornry for Appellant.
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